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Abstract 
Forgiveness is considered to play a key role in the maintenance of social relationships, 
the avoidance of unnecessary conflict, and the ability to move forward with our lives. But 
why is it that some of us find it easier to forgive and forget than others? The current study 
explored the supposed relationship between forgiveness and forgetting. In an initial phase, 30 
participants were given a series of hypothetical incidents and asked to indicate whether or not 
they would forgive the transgressor. Following a standard Think/No-Think procedure where 
participants were trained to think or not to think about some of these incidents, more 
forgetting was observed for incidents which had previously been forgiven following  ‘no-
think’ instructions  compared to either ‘think’ or  baseline conditions. In contrast, no such 
forgetting effects emerged for incidents that had not previously been forgiven. Implications 
for goal-directed forgetting and the relationship between forgiveness and memory are 
considered.   
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“To be wronged is nothing, unless you continue to remember it”  
Confucius (479-551 BC) 
 
One of the most striking examples in the modern era of the power to forgive is that of 
the former South African President Nelson Mandela who, in 1963, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment on charges of attempting to undermine the State of South Africa. On release 
from prison 27 years later, Mandela did not call for revenge, but for forgiveness. In doing so, 
he not only forgave those people who had imprisoned him, but also encouraged others who 
had been the victims of injustice to do the same. Amidst escalating civil discord, his actions 
proved critical in helping to unify a nation that had been torn asunder through the policies of 
apartheid. 
 
While Mandela’s story is one of extraordinary forgiveness in the face of grave 
injustice, it nonetheless illustrates the potential importance of forgiveness for social change 
and reconciliation in society more generally. Yet, despite its assumed role in promoting peace 
and social order, it is only within the last decade that psychologists have begun to focus on 
forgiveness as a testable psychological construct (Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Fincham, 
2000; McCullough, Fincham & Tsang, 2003). As a consequence, a host of associated benefits 
have begun to emerge including enhancements to psychological well-being (Karremans, Van 
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003; Orcutt, 2006; Toussaint & Webb, 2005); physiological 
health (Harris & Thoresen, 2005; Witvliet, Ludwig & Vander Laan, 2001); and spiritual well-
being (Strelan, Acton, & Patrick, 2009).  
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 The act of forgiveness typically involves overcoming strong negative emotions 
towards a transgressor and replacing these with more positive feelings (Enright, Gassin & 
Wu, 1992; Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994). On some occasions, forgiveness may even necessitate 
having to set aside vengeful impulses (DeWall, Pond & Bushman, 2010: Finkel & Campbell, 
2001). From a cognitive perspective, this kind of effortful activity - the need to regulate and 
inhibit inappropriate thoughts and impulses in a goal-directed manner - can be seen to be a 
function of executive control (Denckla, 1996; Payne, 2005; Borkowski & Burke, 1996; Chan, 
Shum, Toulopoulou & Chen, 2008; Pronk, Karremans, Overbeek, Vermulst & Wigboldus, 
2010).  
 
Beyond this, however, relatively little is understood about the actual cognitive 
mechanisms which make it possible to set aside upsetting thoughts and vengeful behaviour. 
As a first step towards addressing this issue, the current article sets out to explore the 
assumed relationship between forgiveness and forgetting. Like the ability to forgive, the 
ability to forget – at least, intentionally – would also appear to be dependent upon the 
efficacy of executive control (see Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Huddleston, 2011; 
R. A. Bjork, 1972). More specifically, motivated forgetting is thought to be a direct function 
of an inhibitory control mechanism which can prevent unwanted memories from entering 
conscious awareness (see Anderson, 2003; Anderson, Green & McCulloch, 2000; Anderson 
& Spellman, 1995; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Storm and Levy, 2102; but see Bulevitch, 
Roediger, Balota & Butler, 2006; MacLeod, 2007; MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson & Bibi, 
2003 for alternative accounts). 
 
In the present study, we used this theoretical perspective to explore the assumed 
relationship between forgiveness and forgetting. In doing so, we employed the Think/No-
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Think (TNT) paradigm in which participants are typically presented with unrelated word 
pairs to learn to criterion (e.g., ‘ordeal-roach’).  They are then trained to forget target words 
associated with previously learned cues. Thus, participants might be presented with the cue 
‘ordeal’ and then asked to keep the associated word from coming to mind (cf., Anderson & 
Green, 2001). Following this procedure, more forgetting occurs for words in the ‘no-think’ 
condition in comparison to ‘think’ or baseline conditions at final test where participants are 
encouraged to retrieve all the previously learned target words (e.g., Anderson, Reinholz, 
Kuhl, & Mayr, 2011; Bergstrom, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009; Hanslmayer, 
Leipold & Bauml, 2010). Most recently, this motivated forgetting effect has also been 
demonstrated to apply to relatively rich autobiographical memories (Noreen & MacLeod, 
2013; Stephens, Braid & Hertel, 2013). Specifically, Noreen and MacLeod found that more 
items of information were systematically forgotten following suppression instructions in 
comparison to items associated with episodes in either ‘think’ or baseline conditions. 
 
The present study explores the possibility that this kind of inhibitory mechanism may 
have relevance for our understanding of how forgiveness may ultimately promote forgetting. 
Indeed, the presumed association between forgiveness and intentional forgetting has had a 
long history as evidenced by the well-known idiom ‘to forgive and forget’ (cf., Corinthians 
13:4-7). What remains unclear, however, is whether there is any basis to assume a causal 
relationship between forgiveness and forgetting. Forgetting, for instance, may play a 
facilitatory role in promoting forgiveness insofar as it may empower individuals to dismiss 
transgressions, thereby enabling the forgiver to preserve valued relationships. The process of 
forgiveness itself, however, may also serve to facilitate forgetting as forgiveness may provide 
the impetus to forget; that is, forgiveness may provide the basis for goal-directed forgetting.  
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As an initial step towards untangling this complex nexus of relationships, the current 
article explores the possible consequences of forgiveness for our ability to intentionally 
forget. To do so, we asked participants to imagine that they were the victim of a number of 
hypothetical scenarios and then to decide on whether they would forgive the transgressor or 
not. In a follow-up session, the same participants were presented with a subset of the 
scenarios originally presented (half had been forgiven and half were not). Following a 
standard TNT procedure (cf., Anderson & Green, 2001), participants were required to recall 
some of the scenarios (i.e., ‘think’ condition), or to avoid saying or thinking anything about 
others (i.e., ‘no-think’ condition). Our rationale was that, if forgiveness affects what we 
ultimately remember, we might expect intentional forgetting to be facilitated for scenarios 
which had previously been forgiven, whereas motivated forgetting could be expected to be 
more difficult to achieve for unforgiven incidents. We also took the opportunity to explore 
the role of dispositional forgiving and the extent to which motivated forgetting might affect 
how transgressions are ultimately perceived. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 30 students (ages 18-39; 25F, 5M) attending the University of St Andrews 
participated in this study for payment (£12.50 ~ $19.23).  Current levels of depression were 
measured using the Beck Depression Inventory-II, (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), and only 
participants with BDI II scores of 9 or below (mean BDI II score = 4.5) were invited to take 
part. 
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Materials 
In order to assess dispositional forgiveness, we employed the Tendency to Forgive 
Scale (TTF; Brown, 2004). The TTF consists of four statements (i.e., “I tend to get over it 
quickly when someone hurts my feelings”) and is designed to explore individual differences 
in people’s responses to incidents where they had been hurt by the actions of others. 
Participants responded by indicating the extent to which they agreed with each statement on a 
7-point scale; higher scores indicated a greater dispositional tendency to forgive.  
  
We also devised a forgiveness questionnaire which contained 40 scenarios adapted 
from the Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire (FAQ; Kanz, 2000) and the Forgiveness 
Likelihood Scale (Rye, 1998; Rye et al, 2001). These scenarios contained fabricated 
transgressions and were designed to assess a variety of hypothetical wrongdoings such as 
infidelity, slander, theft, etc. These scenarios were matched for word length and contained 
information relating to: (i) the offence; (ii) the consequence of the offence; and, (iii) what the 
transgressor did to make amends. For each scenario, the transgressor was depicted as a friend, 
parent, partner or supervisor, or a work colleague or boss. For example, “The offence is that 
your professor does not believe you when you tell them you have not plagiarised your work. 
The consequence is that you are expelled from the university. Later your professor realises 
you were telling the truth and tries to make amends by attempting to get you reinstated”.     
 
Participants were instructed to read the scenario and were then asked whether they 
would forgive the transgressor or not by circling one of two responses (‘yes’ or ‘no’). 
Participants were then given a series of 7-point Likert-type scales and asked how confident 
they were in their decision to forgive or not to forgive the transgressor; how serious they 
considered the offence to be; how motivated they would be to forgive the transgressor; how 
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hurtful they found the offence to be; how sympathetic they were towards the victim; and how 
sympathetic they were towards the transgressor.  
 
Procedure 
In the initial session, participants completed the screening questionnaire, BDI II, the 
TTF, and the forgiveness questionnaire. Responses to the hypothetical scenarios generated at 
least 12 forgiven and 12 unforgiven scenarios for each participant. Also, no participants 
indicated they had previously experienced similar incidents to any of the hypothetical 
scenarios depicted (either as a victim or as an offender) and therefore no one was excluded 
from the study on this basis. The screening and incident rating session took place 7-14 days 
before the second phase (TNT) of the study. 
 
In the second phase, each of the scenarios was paired with an unrelated neutral cue 
word. This resulted in 24 cue-scenario pairings which were subsequently divided into six 
sets, with three sets containing four ‘forgiven’ cue-scenario pairs and three sets containing 
four ‘unforgiven’ cue-scenario pairs. Subsequently, one forgiven and one unforgiven set were 
assigned at random to each of the ‘think’, ‘no-think’, and baseline conditions in the TNT 
procedure. These pairings were fully counterbalanced. Furthermore, two forgiven and two 
unforgiven scenarios were paired with an additional four neutral words to act as fillers. 
 
Learning Phase – Participants were presented with each cue-scenario pair on a 
computer screen for a period of 60s and told to try to remember the pairings. Participants 
were told that each scenario contained information concerning: (i) the offence; (ii) the 
consequence of the offence; and, (ii) how the transgressor tried to make amends. Their task 
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was to try to remember all three details about each scenario. A 500msec inter-trial interval 
preceded the presentation of the next pair. All pairs were presented in a pre-specified order. 
 
Recall Phase – Participants were presented with each cue word for a maximum of 30s 
and instructed to press the space bar as soon as the associated scenario came to mind. 
Participants were given one minute in which to recall the scenario in as much detail as 
possible. In order to help participants achieve this, they were prompted to recall each of the 
three detail types (see above). Following a 500ms delay, feedback was provided on the 
accuracy of recall for each scenario. A correct response was recorded if participants retrieved 
all three descriptions correctly. Regardless of accuracy, participants were again presented 
with the cue-scenario pairings to study. This was followed by an inter-trial interval of 300ms. 
All participants were required to achieve a minimum of 50% on this assessment before 
continuing with the procedure.  
 
Think/No-Think Phase – Participants were told they would be presented with cues in 
either green or red font. Green cues were accompanied by a prompt word related to the 
offence. Participants were asked to briefly summarise the associated offence, the 
consequence of the offence, and what the transgressor did to make amends (i.e., ‘think’ 
condition). For the red cues, participants were simply presented with the cue word and 
instructed to avoid thinking or saying anything about the associated scenario (i.e., ‘no-think’ 
condition). Each trial began with a small cross appearing on the screen for 200ms. 
Subsequently, a cue word (and a prompt word for the green cues) appeared on the screen for 
4s. This was followed by an inter-trial interval of 400ms before the next trial began. 
Participants were presented with 16 of the 24 cue words. Each of the cue words were 
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presented 16 times, resulting in 256 trials in total. Cue words were presented in a pre-
specified order.  
 
Final Recall Phase – Participants were presented with all the cue words originally 
presented and asked to recall the scenarios associated with each cue. Participants were 
initially presented with a cue word for 30s and asked to press the space bar as soon as the 
associated scenario came to mind. Participants were then given 60s in which to recall the 
scenario in as much detail as possible. Again, participants were prompted to recall all three 
details concerned with each scenario (cf. Noreen & MacLeod, 2013). All scenarios were 
recorded. This was followed by an inter-trial interval of 400ms before the next trial began. 
Finally, participants were given a questionnaire containing all the scenarios and asked to 
indicate whether they would forgive the transgressor; how confident they were of their 
decision; how serious the offence was; how motivated they would be to forgive the 
transgressor; how hurtful the offence was; how sympathetic they were towards the victim; 
and how sympathetic they were towards the transgressor.  
 
All the retrieved scenario details were subsequently transcribed and coded in relation 
to the offence, the consequence of the offence, and what the transgressor did to make amends. 
The scenarios were scored as correct if all three descriptions were judged to have 
corresponded to the original scenarios.  A second independent rater scored all the scenarios 
for half of the sample (i.e., 360 scenarios in total). Using Holsti’s method (Holsti, 1969), the 
level of agreement between the two scorers was found to be very high: 97.83% agreement 
overall (agreement: offence = 98%, consequence = 98%, and what the transgressor did to 
make amends = 97.5%).   
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Results 
 
Characteristics of Forgiven and Unforgiven Offences 
Mean confidence ratings regarding decisions to ‘forgive’ or ‘not forgive’ the 
transgressor, the seriousness and the hurtfulness of the offence, the motivation to forgive the 
transgressor, and sympathy towards the victim and the transgressor were each compared 
using a 2 (forgiveness: forgiven vs. unforgiven) x 3 (instruction: baseline vs. think vs. no-
think) mixed design ANOVA. We only report significant effects here (see Table 2 for 
means). These analyses revealed that unforgiven scenarios were perceived as being more 
serious and more hurtful than forgiven scenarios (serious: M = 6.57, SD = 0.32 vs. M = 4.03, 
SD = 0.85, respectively; F (2, 28) = 491.23, p < 0.01, d = 3.96; hurtful: M = 6.47, SD = 0.42 
vs. M = 4.33, SD = 0.80, respectively; F (2, 28) = 317.32, p < 0.01, d = 3.35). Participants 
were also more sympathetic and more motivated to forgive the transgressor for forgiven than 
unforgiven scenarios (sympathetic: M = 4.08, SD = 0.77 vs. M = 6.22, SD = 0.64, 
respectively; F (2, 28) = 392.02, p < 0.01, d = 3.02; motivation to forgive: M = 2.92, SD = 
0.76 vs. M = 5.84, SD = 0.76, respectively; F (2, 28) = 417.62, p < 0.01, d = 3.84). In 
contrast, participants were more sympathetic towards the victim in unforgiven than forgiven 
scenarios (M = 1.43, SD = 0.60 vs. M = 2.58, SD = 0.71, respectively; F (2, 28) = 94.52, p < 
0.01, d = 1.75).  
 
Recall Accuracy in the Recall Phase 
 In order to establish that there were no intrinsic differences in the memorability of 
forgiven and unforgiven scenarios, we conducted a 2 (forgiveness: forgiven vs. unforgiven) x 
3 (instruction: baseline vs. think vs. no-think) mixed design ANOVA on participants’ recall 
performance prior to the introduction of ‘think’/’no-think’ instructions.  This analysis 
revealed neither a significant effect of instruction, F (2, 28) = 0.19, p > 0.05; forgiveness, F 
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(2, 28) = 0.08, p > 0.05; nor an instruction by forgiveness interaction, F (2, 28) = 0.09, p > 
0.05 (see Table 1 for means). Thus, we can be reasonably confident that any differences in 
recall performance following the TNT procedure cannot be attributed to inherent differences 
in the memorability of the scenarios themselves. 
 
Table 1. Mean percentage of scenarios correctly recalled in ‘think’, baseline and ‘no-think’ 
conditions during the recall phase prior to the TNT procedure  
 
  
‘Think’ 
Mean (SD) 
 
Baseline 
Mean (SD) 
 
‘No-Think’ 
Mean (SD) 
 
Forgive 
 
58.33 (23.97) 
 
60.83 (24.29) 
 
62.67 (24.80) 
Not Forgive 59.17 (22.25) 60.0 (21.38) 60.0 (18.10) 
    
TOTAL 58.75 (22.93) 60.42 (22.69) 61.33 (21.57) 
 
 
Recall Accuracy at Final Test 
A 2 (forgiveness: forgiven vs. unforgiven) x 3 (instruction: baseline vs. think vs. no-
think) mixed design ANOVA revealed a main effect of instruction, F (2, 28) = 17.48, p < 
0.01; and a significant instruction by forgiveness interaction, F (2, 28) = 8.31, p < 0.01. 
Subsequent pairwise analyses revealed that participants recalled significantly more details for 
forgiven scenarios in the ‘think’ than in the baseline condition where no instructions to forget 
or remember had been given (M = 77.50, SD = 16.54 vs. M = 60.83, SD = 21.46, 
respectively); t (29) = 4.33, p < 0.001, d = 0.87.  Participants also recalled more details for 
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forgiven scenarios in the ‘think’ condition than in the ‘no-think’ condition (M = 77.50, SD = 
16.54 vs. M = 38.33, SD = 29.16, respectively); t (29) = 7.56, p < 0.001, d = 1.65. 
Importantly, our analysis also revealed that participants showed more forgetting for forgiven 
scenarios in the ‘no-think’ condition in comparison to forgiven scenarios in the baseline 
condition (M = 38.33, SD = 29.16 vs. M = 60.83, SD = 21.46, respectively); t (29) = 4.51, p < 
0.001, d = 0.88. Post-hoc power analysis (G*Power 3.1.7; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 
2007) revealed high statistical power for detecting group differences (1 – β = 0.97; p = 0.008, 
n = 30 and d = 0.88).  
 
In contrast, no difference in recall performance was apparent at final test between 
‘think’ and baseline conditions for unforgiven scenarios (M = 69.17, SD = 19.35 vs. M = 
63.33, SD = 25.20, respectively), t (29) = 1.16, p > 0.05, d = 0.26); or between  ‘think’ and 
‘no think’ conditions for unforgiven scenarios (M = 69.17, SD = 19.35 vs. M = 61.67, SD = 
28.42, respectively), t (29) = 1.20, p > 0.05, d = 0.31. Furthermore, there was no difference in 
recall performance between ‘no-think’ and baseline conditions for unforgiven scenarios (M = 
61.67, SD = 28.42 vs. M = 63.33, SD = 25.20, respectively); t (29) = 1.41, p > 0.05, d = 0.06 
(see Figure 1). Given that these null findings are pivotal to how these data are interpreted, we 
conducted a post-hoc power analysis to ensure that the null effects could not be attributed to 
lack of statistical power (G*Power 3.1.7; Faul et al.,  2007). A two-tailed test revealed that a 
sample size in excess of 15,000 would have been required in order for group differences to 
have reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level (power (1 - β) = 0.80,  p = 0.008).  
 
We also explored whether there were any differences in overall recall performance for 
forgiven and unforgiven scenarios across ‘think’, ‘no-think’, and baseline conditions.  
Subsequent pairwise analyses revealed that there were no significant differences in recall 
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performance between forgiven and unforgiven scenarios in either the ‘think’ (t (29) = 1.79, p 
> 0.05), or baseline conditions, t (29) = 0.41, p > 0.05. Participants, however, recalled 
significantly fewer details when prompted to recall forgiven than unforgiven scenarios in the 
‘no-think’ condition, t (29) = 3.14, p < 0.03.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean percentage of forgiven and unforgiven scenarios correctly recalled in ‘think’, 
baseline and ‘no-think’ conditions (error bars represent + one standard error of the mean). 
 
Effect of forgetting on forgiveness 
We initially compared participants’ ratings for forgiven and unforgiven scenarios on 
the forgiveness questionnaires in the first session (pre-TNT) with those in the second session 
(post-TNT) in order to determine whether there was any effect of no-think instructions on 
subsequent forgiveness. Mean ratings for how confident participants were about their 
decision to forgive or not forgive the transgressor, the seriousness and the hurtfulness of the 
offence, the motivation to forgive the transgressor, and sympathy towards the victim and the 
transgressor were each compared using a 2 (time of rating: session 1 vs. session 2) x 2 
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(forgiveness: forgiven vs. unforgiven) x 3 (instruction: baseline vs. think vs. no-think) mixed 
design ANOVA. These analyses revealed that there was neither an effect of time, nor a time 
by forgiveness by instruction interaction for any of these dimensions; all tests, p > 0.05. See 
Table 2. Furthermore, in order to determine whether participants were more forgiving of 
offences following the instruction to suppress, a 2 (time of rating: session 1 vs. session 2) x 2 
(forgiveness: forgive vs. not forgive) chi square analysis was also conducted. This analysis 
revealed that there was no significant difference in participants’ tendency to forgive 
following suppression instructions, χ = 6.0, p > 0.05.   
 
Table 2. Mean ratings for scenarios at Time 1 (pre-TNT) and Time 2 (post-TNT)   
 
     Time 1 (SD)   Time 2 (SD) 
 
Confidence in the decision to forgive  5.55 (0.79)  5.43 (0.81) 
Seriousness of the offence   5.30 (1.43)  5.09 (1.03) 
Harmfulness of the offence   5.40 (1.25)  5.26 (1.26) 
Motivation to forgive the offender  4.38 (1.65)  4.11 (1.58) 
Sympathy towards the victim   2.00 (0.88)  1.95 (0.78) 
Sympathy towards the offender  5.15 (1.28)  5.01 (1.28) 
 
 
Dispositional Forgiveness and Forgetting 
We also explored whether there was a relationship between dispositional forgiveness 
(as indexed by the TTF scale) and the extent of forgetting observed for both forgiven and 
unforgiven scenarios. Forgetting effect size was calculated by subtracting baseline scores 
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from suppression scores, with higher positive scores reflecting larger forgetting effects (cf., 
Levy & Anderson, 2008; Noreen & MacLeod, 2013). No relationship was found between the 
extent of forgetting and dispositional forgiveness for either forgiven scenarios, r (30) = 0.22, 
p > 0.05; or for unforgiven scenarios, r (30) = 0.22, p > 0.05. This would suggest that one’s 
inherent tendencies to forgive - at least, as measured in the current study - are unrelated to 
one’s ability to forget.  
 
Discussion  
Despite the fact that the virtues of being able to ‘forgive and forget’ have been 
extolled for centuries (McCullough et al., 1998), the current study represents the first 
empirical evidence that a link exists between forgiveness and intentional forgetting. Our 
findings suggest that, when individuals have already forgiven a transgressor, memories 
related to the forgiven offence are more susceptible to subsequent motivated forgetting. 
When individuals have not forgiven the transgressor, however, participants are less 
successful in suppressing details related to unforgiven incidents. Importantly, these 
differences in final recall performance cannot be ascribed to inherent differences in the 
memorability of forgiven and unforgiven scenarios in our study; recall performance prior to 
the TNT procedure was shown to be equivalent for both types of scenarios across ‘think’, 
‘no-think’, and baseline conditions.  
 
Our study also raises the intriguing possibility that the relationship between forgiving 
and forgetting may be less dependent upon one’s inherent disposition to forgive and more 
reliant upon whether one has actually forgiven the transgressor. This, in turn, may be a 
function of the characteristics of the transgression (e.g., seriousness) and/or the effectiveness 
of inhibitory control. The fact that there exists considerable variation in the ability to inhibit 
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unwanted memories (Levy & Anderson, 2008) raises the possibility that there may also be 
variability in the extent to which vengeful thoughts and deeds can be inhibited. It is important 
to acknowledge here, however, that, as independent cues were not employed at final test (cf., 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995), we cannot be certain that the observed forgetting effects were a 
function of inhibition per se – only that the forgetting effects were consistent with an 
inhibitory account. While we recognise the need to address this important question, it is 
equally important to have established a link between forgiveness and subsequent memory 
performance.  
 
Finally, there is the possibility that motivational factors may have contributed to the 
absence of forgetting for unforgiven scenarios following instructions to suppress. One could 
surmise that, if one is not prepared to forgive, one may be less willing to forget the details of 
the incident as such details may serve as justification for future retaliatory actions. It is worth 
noting here, however, that there was no evidence of enhanced recall performance for 
unforgiven scenarios in comparison to baseline. Thus, while the motivation to remember 
wrongs perpetrated by others remains a possibility, there is little evidence from the present 
study to suggest that such factors can account for the absence of forgetting for unforgiven 
incidents. 
 
In conclusion, our findings would indicate that forgiveness facilitates forgetting 
insofar as, once individuals have forgiven a transgressor, the forgiver is more successful at 
suppressing the details concerned with the offence. The ability to forget such upsetting 
memories may, in turn, provide an effective coping strategy which ultimately enables people 
to move on with their lives. In time, research in this new field of enquiry may be able to 
combine forgetting- and forgiveness-based interventions which, in turn, may give rise to 
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powerful therapeutic tools that will enable us to ‘forgive and forget’ more effectively. In the 
meantime, it would seem that, while forgiving remains an effortful process, forgetting may 
actually become easier as a result.  
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